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Police Violence and Corruption in the 
Philippines: Violent Exchange and the 
War on Drugs 
Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal 
Abstract: In this article we explore the relationship between money and 
violence in the Philippine war on drugs. Building on long-term ethno-
graphic and political engagement with a poor urban neighbourhood in 
Manila, we suggest that while the war on drugs has taken state killings to 
a new level, the Philippine state was no stranger to killing its own citizens 
before its onset. Furthermore, we argue that we cannot dissociate the 
killings from the rampant corruption in the Philippine police. By invok-
ing the concept of violent exchange, the article shows that both corrup-
tion and death enter into particular understandings of state–citizen rela-
tionships. Because the war has reconfigured how death and corruption 
work, people in urban Manila are attempting desperately – as the stakes 
are high – to figure out how to engage with the police under these trans-
forming conditions. 
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When Rodrigo Duterte took over the Philippine presidency in June 2016 
he ushered in a war on drugs, as he had promised to do in the campaign. 
He drew on his alleged successes in curbing petty crime and fighting 
drugs in his hometown of Davao City on the island of Mindanao (Altez 
and Caday 2017; Quimpo 2017; Curato 2017). While he proudly claimed 
ownership for hundreds of deaths, he managed to avoid legal responsi-
bility. Human rights groups in the Philippines and abroad were aghast as 
the consequences of the nationwide war on drugs began to show in the 
death toll. By late 2016, approximately 9,000 casualties, mostly from the 
poorest areas of urban Manila, had been ascribed to the war on drugs 
(Human Rights Watch 2017). While critiques are mounting abroad and at 
home, the Philippine government has denied responsibility and claimed 
that their campaign of Tokhang1 was not a strategy of extrajudicial kill-
ings, but rather, as the name indicates, a policy of registering, talking to, 
and rehabilitating drug addicts. The government also tried to skirt re-
sponsibility for the many killings by referring to criminal infighting and 
unsolved murders rather than police killings. However, evidence is 
mounting that Tokhang watchlists have in fact been turned into kill lists 
(Human Rights Watch 2017). This has raised academic and political 
debates about the shocking return to authoritarian rule and the produc-
tion of a deadly sovereignty (Reyes 2016) where those deemed “disposa-
ble” (Tadiar 2013) can be killed without sanction (Agamben 1998).  
While we agree with these criticisms, from our vantage point in ur-
ban Manila where we and our partners have undertaken fieldwork and 
human rights work since 2008, two issues seem to warrant further con-
sideration. First, while Duterte’s war on drugs and the killing of Filipinos 
represent a radicalisation and mark a new deadly phase, the Philippine 
state is no stranger to killing its own people (McCoy 2009). The second 
issue is that the focus on sovereignty and the production of authority 
through fear obscures the fact that police violence is and always has been 
animated by extortion rackets, radicalised in the present as “Tokhang for 
ransom” (Coronel 2017). However, rather than taking the practice of 
extortion at face value, we propose viewing these practices as part of 
intricate exchange relations where violence, or the threat of it, is key 
(Jensen et al. 2017). Drawing on anthropologist David Graeber’s (2011) 
contribution, we suggest that violence is the means through which hu-
man relations are transformed into human economies of equivalence – 
that is, violence and the threat of violence produce relations and ex-
                                                 
1  Tokhang means “knock and plead” and refers to local officials doing the rounds 
by alerting drug addicts and telling them to join drug rehabilitation programmes. 
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changes in which human life is price-tagged in ways that the police and 
even residents (sometimes) believe are legitimate and useful: violence, or 
the threat of violence, is what propels people to pay.2 This, in turn, es-
tablishes a set of complicated exchange relations understood as intense 
negotiations and exchanges of material and symbolic resources between 
police and the policed.3  
We ask in this article,  
How are violence and exchange relations connected in policing 
the Metro Manila district of Bagong Silang, and how have these 
exchange relations transformed in relation to the war on drugs as 
ushered in by President Duterte?  
In answering these questions, we propose two related arguments: First, 
exchange relations constitute precarious encounters that need to be 
managed with the utmost care by both police and those they are extort-
ing within a parallel, corrupt, and often violent system that mirrors the 
official criminal justice system. Second, the war on drugs, even if it was 
also couched in an anti-corruption language, has transformed the param-
eters of violent exchange in ways that made the system even more ex-
pensive, expansive, and unstable.  
In order to conceptualise policing relations as exchange relations, 
we draw on Janet Roitman’s important insight that the focus should not 
be limited to regulation or authority as such; rather, we must also take 
into account the relationships that are called forth and produced by regu-
lation (Roitman 2004). In her analysis of illegality and social relations in 
the Chad Basin, she illustrates the prominence of social relations over 
institutional concerns of sovereignty and state power in the Agambean 
sense. Two caveats are necessary at this stage: First, when we employ 
Roitman’s notion of regulation, we do not mean regulation as expressed 
in normative frameworks of how regulation should be (in terms of what 
is laid out in the laws and what institutions should do). Rather, we must 
understand regulation as existing policies and practices such as, in our 
case, the drug war, the over-burdened prison system, and the extortion 
of money by police in exchange for release. These are not necessarily 
                                                 
2  Graeber says, “It is only by the threat of sticks, ropes, spears and guns that one 
can tear people out of those endlessly complicated webs of relationship with 
others (sisters, friends, rivals…) that render them unique, and thus reduce them 
to something that can be traded” (Graeber 2011: 208). 
3  In talking about exchange relations, we draw on anthropological understand-
ings of exchange relations as pioneered by, for instance, Marcel Mauss (1966) 
and as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1977). 




indications of state failure; they are constitutive of state control. Second, 
when we evoke exchange relations from economic anthropology, we do 
not suggest that reciprocity involves equality or mutual consensus. Ra-
ther, following Anette Weiner (1992) and Marilyn Strathern (1988), ex-
change relations are always unequal and often coerced.  
Empirically, the article draws on data from a long-term engagement 
in the form of research and human rights intervention in Bagong Silang. 
This data consists of ethnographic material from different periods of 
fieldwork (Jensen, 2015), quantitative data from a victimisation survey 
(Jensen, Hapal and Modvig 2013), interviews with the police and policing 
agencies both before and after the introduction of the Tokhang (Hapal 
and Jensen 2017), and interventionist human rights reporting and docu-
mentation of the Balay Rehabilitation Centre. While this constitutes a 
strong data set, the war on drugs is evolving and ever-shifting. In a sense, 
we are trying to pin down a moving target. However, we think it is im-
perative to engage with the consequences of the war – even if some of 
the conclusions can only be tentative. A reader would also be warranted 
in asking to what extent we can generalise from our account of Bagong 
Silang, the largest barangay, or district, in the Philippines in terms of both 
area and population. The drug war has disproportionately hit poor areas 
of Manila and we are quite certain that we can at least ask similar ques-
tions in similar areas of the city. The borders of the drug war also explain 
why Duterte’s popularity remains high, as most people are correct in 
assuming that the war is on someone else. In this way, the drug war puts 
into stark relief the class distinctions of Philippine society.  
We organise our argument chronologically and begin by outlining 
policing in Bagong Silang before the war on drugs as caught between 
sovereignty and exchange. This analysis will equip us to ask a different 
set of questions in the section about Tokhang as violent exchange and 
the art of making money during the drug war. We end by discussing 
reconfigurations of the relationship between exchange and violence to 
suggest that residents are dealing with a constant sense of unease and 
unpredictability, as they draw on experiential tactics that used to work 
but increasingly seem overwhelmed by the transformation to their social 
world introduced by the drug war. 
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Policing Bagong Silang: Between “Ok lang” and 
Excessive Violence 
Since its inception as a relocation site in 1986, Bagong Silang has been 
perceived as a security threat – a hotbed of criminality and political mo-
bilisation.4 The relocation site, a pet project of former first lady and for-
mer governor of Metro Manila Imelda Marcos, was established both to 
address the perceived overflow of people in the centres of Manila and as 
a counter-insurgency strategy to break up political organisation elsewhere 
in the city. In time, Bagong Silang grew more peaceful while not neces-
sarily being perceived in less stigmatising ways as a violent and drug-
infested place. As we show below, this created fertile ground for Duter-
te’s war on drugs. Policing was eventually slightly demilitarised and much 
order-giving was delegated to the hands of the so-called Barangay Justice 
System, which was established within the jurisdiction of the barangay 
government (the lowest tier of governance in the Philippines). In this 
system, the chairman nominates so-called purok (area) leaders who then 
choose a number of tanods (guards). Purok leaders and tanods are respon-
sible for the local peace. Only when they cannot resolve conflicts locally 
through mediation or if the transgression carries fines above PHP 5,000 
or more than one year in prison will the case be referred to the Philip-
pine National Police (PNP). In 2010 the PNP had only 70 officers in 
Bagong Silang – a number that has increased to approximately 100 since 
the war on drugs began, compared to more than 1,000 purok leaders and 
tanods.  
In a survey carried out in 2010, 65 per cent of respondents charac-
terised police performance as “normal” (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig 
2013). Given the rather notorious reputation of the police in Bagong 
Silang, this response appeared contradictory. In the vernacular of every-
day life, the police are referred to as buwaya (crocodiles) or linta (leeches), 
both concepts that point to the extortionist inclinations of the police. 
The police’s capacity to extort money is based on their ability to threaten 
and ultimately use violence, including unlawful arrest. However, a more 
complex picture emerged once we began to explore the numbers in more 
detail. In follow-up interviews, we asked what respondents had meant by 
“normal.” The majority replied in Tagalog “ok lang,” which translates 
into “just OK,” which suggests that the police’s performance was “as 
expected.” “Ok lang” meant that the behaviour of the police was as antic-
                                                 
4  Almost all quotes from interviewees in this paper were originally in Tagalog; all 
translations into English were done by the authors. 




ipated and, through diskarte (the ability to survive through cunning and 
wits), connections, money, or a combination of the three, it may be man-
aged. Let us provide some more ethnographic flesh to this argument by 
looking at the case of Emiliyo’s son Karl. 
Emiliyo’s son Karl had been arrested by the police one night in 
2010, as he and friends of his had been drinking in the street and, as the 
night progressed, fights broke out. A woman whose son was involved in 
the fighting had called the police to get them to stop the fighting. How-
ever, the police came and arrested them all rather harshly, including her 
son, and brought them to the police station. Karl had asked the police, 
who were in civilian clothes, to show their police ID to identify them-
selves. The police took offence, thinking him maangas (arrogant) and 
grabbed him violently. Panic spread among the families of those arrest-
ed. At the beginning, Emiliyo did not know where Karl and his friend 
(plus two others) had been taken, so he had contacted the local purok 
leader, who was his relative, to ask if he could help find Karl. The purok 
leader and his tanods went first to a substation but found it empty be-
cause all the police had gone to the hospital in relation to a police shoot-
ing! Karl was finally located in the central police station. Emiliyo, who 
was quite worried, then sent one of his relatives, Inday, to stay near the 
police station in case something should happen to Karl.  
Emiliyo called Inday because he knew that she was matapang (coura-
geous) and that she had relatives working within the police. The police 
told Inday that one policeman had lost a phone while breaking up the 
fight that night and that Emiliyo’s family would need to pay PHP 7,000 
for it. The phone was supposedly worth PHP 14,000 but because it was 
used the police demanded only PHP 7,000. At this point in relating the 
tale to us, Inday uttered the word “extortion.” The police told her if the 
family did not pay, they would inquest them. “What are the charges?”, 
she asked. The police said it was a case of public scandal and assaulting a 
police officer. Inday said, “We are not paying. Go ahead and inquest 
them!” She called her cousin, a senior police officer. She told the cousin 
that a godchild of hers had been arrested and what the circumstances 
were. Her cousin promised that he would call the station and instructed 
her to wait. In the meantime, Inday and Karl’s brother went to the baran-
gay office to report the case. “This was done to protect Karl,” she said, 
indicating that the more reports there were on the whereabouts of Karl, 
the safer he would be. 
Back at the station, Inday’s police officer cousin called the station. 
She could hear her cousin (a superior) telling something to the officer in 
the station. After the phone call, the officer told his colleague that they 
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must release the boys, but the colleague was contesting the release. He 
was one of those who felt that Karl had been maangas when he asked the 
police to identify themselves: “He should know that we are police when 
the van was outside and we introduced ourselves as police.” Inday quiet-
ly said, “But isn’t it the right of people to ask for the ID, especially when 
the police are in civilian clothes?!” The officer continued, “But there are 
also the costs. Who will pay for the bullets we used when firing warning 
shots [they had shot into the ground]? Who will pay for petrol?” Inday 
then asked, “So, if we cannot pay, you will not release them?” “Not 
exactly,” he answered. Then Inday said, “OK, thank you,” and left. Out-
side the police station, she called her police officer cousin again and 
explained the situation. He promised to take care of it. 
Karl’s brother remained at the police station. Also there were the 
mothers of the two other young men, including the woman who had 
called the police in the first place. One of the mothers was already 
known to the police as the wife of an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) 
and, therefore, as someone with money. The police had had earlier en-
counters with her son, who was apparently a drug addict. Inside the cell, 
one of the police officers told Karl that the reason why it was taking 
such a long time for them to be released was because the police were 
waiting for the payment from this particular woman. Negotiations went 
ahead. In the end, the mother who called the police paid PHP 2,000 for 
the release, whereas the mother of a third young man paid PHP 500. 
Afterwards, the mother who paid PHP 500 told Inday, “I just wanted it 
to be over so [my son] would get out of the cells and be safe. That’s why 
I paid.” After this, the four young men involved were released.  
The case illustrates both that corruption is systemic and the extent 
to which some officers are complicit in the system. It is routinised to the 
point that release almost has a price tag attached to it. The term for this 
kind of police behaviour is hulidap. Hulidap combines the verbs huli (ar-
rest) and hold up. It designates the practice of police holding up people 
through the threat of arrest. More importantly, however, it illustrates 
what people meant when they said “ok lang” – that is, people can manage 
the extortive tendencies of the police by employing intimate relation-
ships, money or other resources, and/or a combination of diskarte and 
luck. This is what allows some people to negotiate successfully with the 
police. However, it is these same relationships that the police prey on or 
capitalise on in their practices of extortion. While the police seclude 
people and threaten them with prison and violence, channels of commu-
nication must be open in order for those on the inside to activate their 
networks and relationships on the outside. The task of the police is to 




manage these connections, of which some can be beneficial for the po-
lice and others can be problematic.  
While hulidap is potentially viewed as “ok lang,” or to some extent 
manageable, this practice inherently relies on violence to extract money. 
However, the relative manageability of practices like hulidap vanishes 
when the police use violence considered as excessive. These excessive 
forms of violence relate to “salvaging,” a term meaning extrajudicial 
police killings. In Bagong Silang, the image of extreme forms of police 
violence persists in the minds of people (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig 
2013). This perception has been enforced and reproduced by the violent 
policing and extrajudicial killings that occurred before the drug war. 
Hence, we might distinguish heuristically between two forms of state 
violence – the “ok lang” and the excessively violent. As an example of the 
excessive side of policing, take the following example, pieced together 
through interviews, police and media reports, and documentation by 
human rights observers.  
At around 8 p.m. one night, José, Jay, and Renato went to a man 
who owed José money. José brought a gun and asked Jay and Renato to 
be his “backup.” While walking to the man’s house, the three young men 
encountered a police officer. The police searched them and discovered 
José’s gun. Jay and Renato ran, while José was detained by the police 
officer, who called him a holdaper (robber) out loud. Consequently, on the 
way to the police station, people on the street attacked José.5 When he 
arrived at the police station, he was allegedly beaten up repeatedly. The 
police presented him with a paper with names on it and asked where 
those people were staying. The next morning, José, weak from the beat-
ings, was taken to the main police station where a case was filed against 
him. While inside the jail, he considered filing a torture case against the 
police who maltreated him. However, as he feared reprisals against his 
family, he could not make up his mind. José’s two companions were later 
found dead. A news article that took notice of the incident referred to 
the murder of the two a drug deal gone wrong. However, suspicions 
lingered that they had died at the hands of the police. 
                                                 
5  This contradicts the conclusions from the victimisation survey we conducted in 
2010 (Jensen, Hapal, and Modvig 2013), where people indicated that it was not 
OK for the police to beat up suspects. We tend to think that respondents in the 
survey probably thought it was the right thing to oppose police violence rather 
than speak their minds regarding the victimisation of robbers. Hence, one 
woman noted in conversation, “It’s OK they are beaten up. They are bad peo-
ple.” 
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The case of José is revealing in several ways. First, the fact that José 
was involved in criminal activity made him victimisable in the eyes of 
both the police and the public. While this clearly does not exonerate the 
state officials or legitimise their actions, José’s actions made him an easy 
target. Another factor exacerbated José’s fate: law enforcement agents 
are generally not allowed to arrest people under the age of 18, as José 
was, but have to release them into the care of parents and social work-
ers.6 This sense of impotence felt by officers of the law arguably entices 
them to engage in extralegal activities that are legitimised in the name of 
protecting law-abiding citizens from people like José.7 José’s case was 
hardly an isolated incident. One law enforcement officer confirmed the 
practice of violently and extrajudicially dealing with young people. In an 
interview in 2010 the officer said, “I won’t lie about it. We do kill people. 
I myself have killed a lot of people in Bagong Silang.” According to him, 
these practices are known and sanctioned by their superiors: “Let’s just 
put it this way. Every action that we take, our superior knows about it.” 
While these statements are truly worrying, we need to be careful not 
to take them at face value. The officer seems to be casting the police and 
himself as powerful and vengeful agents, organised in strict hierarchies 
of death. In this way, the narrative resembles the image of a strong, ef-
fective but gruesome military organisation. The statements are therefore 
arguably part of a narrative structure of strength and nocturnal secrets. 
While killings and torture also happened before the war on drugs, they 
were not always carried out in the ordered, disciplined, and effective 
manner in which the law enforcement agent narrates them. But why do 
law enforcement officials need to carry out these acts of violence and 
render them intelligible through the narrative of the effective but grue-
some policing structure? Another law enforcement officer explained this 
in 2010 by evoking a sacred and epic fight between good and evil that 
has been actualised during the war on drugs: 
The people we put down are not people anymore. They are de-
mons that need to be removed from the face of the earth. We the 
police are like angels that battle those demons. We know what is 
right and we know that what those criminals do is not right. I am 
                                                 
6  This is due to a Republic Act (RA 9344) also called the Juvenile Justice Act of 
2006 that stipulates that minors under the age of 18 cannot be detained in jail 
but must be put into youth shelters. However, as those shelters are often full, 
the youngsters are often simply released. 
7  This echoes police complaints about human rights across the world. They use 
almost identical words to describe their opposition to human rights. For South 
Africa, see Marks 2005 and Hornberger 2011. 




not afraid to die today. If I die today, I have the courage to justify 
to my God that I have done the right thing. I will even wish to be 
put on the front lines of his army to battle those demons. If He 
wishes that I be in hell, I have no problem with that. I have no re-
grets about the things that I did. 
From this perspective, society is composed of “good” people and de-
mons (demonyo). The role of the police is, predictably, like avenging an-
gels, to eliminate the demons to protect society – in other words, to keep 
the integrity of the “thin blue line.” While some might be dismissive of 
the police’s justification of the use of (excessive) violence and the ac-
companying assertion that it is meted out in a predictable, effective, and 
almost scientific way, we believe that it is reflective of a rather compli-
cated and difficult policing situation. The police’s narrative is one that 
stresses that justice will prevail, through the nocturnal death of the crim-
inals, by the hands of secret and strong forces of order. Yet, before the 
war on drugs it was not uncommon for law enforcement agents in Ba-
gong Silang to despondently talk about their difficulties with “criminals” 
seeming to disappear in the maze of houses and life. What accounts for 
the discrepancy between the narrative of the strong, nocturnal force and 
the sense of impotence? Given the police’s institutional capacities and 
resources, law enforcement in Bagong Silang is at best challenging and at 
worst compromised. It is in this light that protecting order from chaos 
would seem stretched and porous.8 The epic battle against evil therefore 
signifies a rationalisation of violence in the light of a sense of impotence. 
Nonetheless, the image of the vengeful angel continues to animate polic-
ing. It is in this way that we must understand the term “salvaging” or 
extrajudicial killing – the hard and dirty job of saving the nation. This 
narrative, as we shall see later, provided a fertile ground for Duterte’s 
war on drugs five years later. 
Violent Exchange 
While some policing practices are “ok lang” and others are “excessive,” 
this does not mean that the two are unrelated. On the contrary, they 
exist in and through each other. Through the epic narrative of vengeful 
angels, the practices of the crocodile are rendered at least partially invisi-
ble and its actions legitimatised. In the case above, Emiliyo was very 
                                                 
8  The idea of the thin blue line is shared in many policing organisations across 
the world, as is the notion that violence is necessary to carry out what they see 
as their duty (Hornberger 2011; Steinberg 2008; Jensen 2008). 
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aware of the connection between salvaging and the troubles in which 
Karl found himself. In this way, violence – its history as salvaging and 
the concrete experiences of people – is central for the practices of the 
crocodile. The crocodile is successful only because of the fear of salvag-
ing. Violence is the lubricant that allows the corrupt practices of the 
crocodile to continue. 
While invoking the concept of corruption is surely one way of ap-
proaching the relations between the police and the policed, the interac-
tion is more complex than that. Let us revisit some of the central ele-
ments of Karl’s ordeals. First, the identities of the police and the policed 
are inherently blurred and complex; second, much more than money is 
being exchanged. The blurred and complex relationship is illustrated by 
the presence of Inday’s cousin, a senior police officer in Bagong Silang. 
Inday is indeed fortunate to have such relations, but such relations are 
not unique. Emiliyo also uses his connections to the local purok leader 
and his associates (the tanods); others would employ whatever relations 
they can muster. Hence, while Inday found it deplorable that the police 
acted as they did, she also cherishes her relations with officialdom and 
wants them to function when she needs them. Emiliyo is also fully aware 
of the value of such relations and even tried to enter into a debt relation 
with the police officer. Hence, the buwaya is used to describe the negative 
side of a relational economy; as Olivier de Sardan notes in relation to the 
moral economy of corruption (de Sardan 1999), this relational economy 
is also highly cherished and people will go far to protect their relations.  
The case also hints at a more benevolent relationship between of-
ficers and residents. As we describe elsewhere (Hapal and Jensen 2017), 
police officers understand their admittedly corrupt relationship with 
residents in terms of help – tulong or ayuda in Tagalog. While we can see 
this aspect when one officer assures the brother of Karl that they will 
still be released, it is more explicit in other cases. In one interview, one 
police officer admits that she received a bit of money to settle a case 
between a husband and a wife, suggesting that she helped the wife by 
setting the husband straight while keeping him out of prison so that he 
could provide for the family. Hence, the overburdened justice system 
provides an important reason for people wanting to engage in the rela-
tional economy. Drawing on Janet Roitman’s (2004) insights, we might 
say that it is exactly the non-functioning justice system that sets in mo-
tion and structures the relational economy.  
To conclude this section, in all these cases, the relational economy 
between the police and the policed is highly complex and defies neat 
binary distinctions. These incidents suggest the simultaneity and coexist-




ence of the angel and the crocodile in the minds of people, who want the 
police to apprehend criminals, protect the innocent, and keep law and 
order (the angel) while at the same time being open to the relational 
economy of connections (the positive side of the crocodile). It was 
against the backdrop of this relational economy that Duterte’s drug war 
hit Bagong Silang. 
Violent Exchange and the War on Drugs 
In the previous sections, we showed that the Philippine police are no 
strangers to killing their own citizens as part of what is termed salvaging 
– a term that goes back to the period of martial law between 1972 and 
1986 and the counter-insurgency wars against Maoist, Moro, and Islamic 
uprisings into the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s (McCoy 2009; 
Altez and Caday 2017). As part of an emic cosmology, police officers 
constructed a binary world of angels and demons as part of a moral 
legitimisation of extreme forms of violence that people were rather am-
bivalent about: while civilians identified salvaging as the worst danger, 
they also condoned and even participated in violence – for instance, 
against José. When the police officer, evoking the notions of demons 
and angles, insisted that he would want to fight crime regardless of the 
price he has to pay, he speaks of the danger of prosecution that he would 
face should he be caught in the act. This threat, however, was exactly 
what Duterte’s war on drugs did away with, at least unofficially.  
The war on drugs was organised as what is called the “Double Bar-
rel” campaign, consisting of two different operations: Oplan Tokhang, 
literally “Operation Knock and Plead,” entails police and local authori-
ties going around to identified houses of what are referred to as known 
addicts and dealers, registering them, pleading for them to turn them-
selves in, and warning them of the dangers they are facing should they 
not heed. The second element of Double Barrel is Project HVT (High-
Value Targets), which targets drug lords, drug protectors, and drug fi-
nanciers in order to reach the higher echelons of the drug syndicates 
(Lamchek 2017). Often it seems that it has been difficult to separate the 
two strategies. In discourse, however, the administration and the police 
have denied that they kill people extrajudicially and insisted that most of 
the killings have been drug-on-drug killings, cases of police acting in self-
defence, or murders by still unknown perpetrators. While this cannot be 
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completely disregarded, in spite of mounting evidence to the contrary,9 
the perception among our informants in Bagong Silang is that the killings 
are associated with Tokhang. By being seen to have unleashed the police 
and promising to protect individual officers, Duterte seems to have legit-
imised, from the highest level of government, the extrajudicial killing of 
people like José. We might say that the angel was given licence to be an 
avenging angel.  
However, as before the war, the police oscillated between the angel 
and the crocodile, where the former enabled and partly “invisibilised” 
the latter. While the crocodile thrived exactly on the potentiality of angel-
ic violence, the corrupt practices were never out of view for the policed. 
They knew and sometimes tapped into the relational economy of the 
violent exchange to an extent where it was “ok lang,” manageable! The 
question, then, is what happened to this relational economy of violence 
with the declaration of the war on drugs? One answer is that it did not 
disappear – almost the opposite occurred, as Sheila Coronel (2017) illus-
trates in her insightful and well-documented essay “Murder as Enter-
prise.” Coronel tells the story of South Korean businessman Jee Ick Joo, 
who was kidnapped by police officers only a few months into the war on 
drugs, brought to the National Police Headquarters, and strangled to 
death. Police officers proceeded to extort money from his wife, who 
paid PHP 5 million for his safe release, not knowing he was already dead. 
Only one month later, after several payments, was it revealed that Jee 
had died; his remains had been flushed down the toilet just doors down 
from the office of the national police chief. This practice – the ultimate 
cashing in on the mandate to use violence – came to be known as “To-
khang for ransom.” This represents a much more sinister incarnation of 
the buwaya – one that steals and robs but with whom you cannot talk or 
negotiate. 
The death of Jee forced the administration to suspend the war on 
drugs for one month in January and February 2017 until the police were 
                                                 
9  See reports by Human Rights Watch (2017) and by the UN Special Rapporteur 
for Extrajudicial Executions, Agnes Calamard. While our own analysis from 
Bagong Silang backs up the reports, the government might be correct in sug-
gesting that the UN and international organisations have been single-minded in 
identifying the police as the ultimate perpetrators. Our material suggests that 
there is great uncertainty about perpetrators. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that 
other violent networks are involved, taking advantage of the war on drugs to 
settle other scores. 




“cleansed” of corrupt elements.10 The Jee fiasco led President Duterte to 
accuse the police force of being “corrupt to the core” and even to claim 
that at least 40 per cent of the police force was engaged in illegal activi-
ties.11 Despite drawing flak from the president, there have been persis-
tent reports of continued corrupt practices. One rather blatant example 
was the discovery of secret detention centres, where suspects would be 
held until their families paid up.12 What this suggests is that while there 
have been attempts to root out corruption, they have not worked. In 
fact, it seems that the more the angel is allowed to be an angel, the better 
the conditions are for the crocodile. In the remainder of this paper, we 
will present empirical material from Bagong Silang that allows for tenta-
tive conclusions to be drawn on the relationship between violence and 
money in the war on drugs. We begin by exploring how one makes 
money on the war on drugs. A good place to start is the notorious area 
known as Phase 12. 
Making Money on the War on Drugs 
The drug trade and the production of shabu (methamphetamine) in Ba-
gong Silang have always been closely connected to the area called Phase 
12, about one kilometre from the eastern border of Bagong Silang and 
part of another barangay. During fieldwork between 2009 and before the 
onset of the war on drugs, we never succeeded in going there. People 
would flatly refuse to accompany us or connect us with anyone in the 
area, as it was deemed to be very dangerous. Apart from the relations to 
the drug trade, the area was also feared because the majority of its inhab-
itants were Muslims from Mindanao, a population that, for most people 
in the Christian Philippines, not least in Manila, was seen as the incarna-
tion of danger and violence.13  However, after the war on drugs had 
                                                 
10  See <www.manilatimes.net/pnp-stops-tokhang-starts-cleanup/309811/> and 
<www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/02/28/Duterte-resumes-poli 
ces-war-on-drugs-in-Philippines/5181488297974/>.  
11  See <http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/01/30/17/you-are-corrupt-to-the-core-
duterte-tells-cops>. 
12  See <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/895871/chr-asks-ombudsman-to-probe-ton 
do-secret-detention-cell>. 
13  This has a very long history, going back to the Spanish period (Abinales 2000). 
Muslim–Christian relations are deeply fraught in the Philippines, and Bagong 
Silang is no exception. In Bagong Silang, Muslims have been associated with 
the drug trade and informal street trading. Street trading has also been seriously 
curbed in recent years. Whereas Muslims used to dominate the trade, they are 
all but gone now. In this way, two of the main economic activities undertaken 
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commenced, people said it was no longer so dangerous and we could go. 
Some residents of Phase 12 said that “those big-timers” had left their 
houses and gone back to Mindanao. When we finally went, the adventure 
– none of us had been before – was facilitated by Bondo. A few months 
into the war, he had been asked by a resident in Phase 12, a Muslim drug 
dealer, to take care of his house while he and his family went to Minda-
nao, probably in fear of their lives. Asked when they would return, 
Bondo laughed and said “after six years,” indicating the end of Duterte’s 
term. However, he was not sure they would ever return.  
Bondo knew the drug dealer because he had been coming regularly 
to Phase 12 to collect garbage for reselling. Bondo and his family were 
dirt-poor, staying in what are known as excess lots near the creek. As it is 
a particularly unhealthy environment, they had jumped at the chance of 
actually inhabiting a house with a television and sanitation. Bondo ex-
plained that this was far from the only house where this had happened: it 
has occurred at “many houses,” he said. His benefactor had approached 
him one day as he was coming through with his cart, saying that he 
would like Bondo to stay in his house while he was gone, just out of 
pakikisama, a Tagalog term that has deep roots in Philippine culture. One 
mid-twentieth-century anthropologist translated it as “smooth interper-
sonal relationships” (Lynch 1963). Elsewhere, we have described it as 
characteristic of reciprocity or mutual obligations between people of 
relatively equal status (Jensen and Hapal 2014). However, it is something 
of a rarity between rich and poor, where utang na loob (lit. “inner debt”), 
constituting vertical debt relations, is much more common.  
Bondo indicated other houses abandoned by the owners. He said 
that the police went to these houses and emptied them out, allegedly 
bringing the contents of the houses to the police station. Bondo pointed 
to a big house and said, “They come at night. You could see the lights 
there and cars outside and then they would be gone along with all the 
things in the house.” When asked if anybody said anything about it, 
Bondo shrugged, “What can you say? It’s the police.” 
We asked if there had been any killings in Phase 12. “No,” said 
Bondo, “but, there have been arrests (huli).” He explained,  
Some of them pay piyansa [bail] and they come back. Others have 
not paid so they are there now in the jail […]. The [amount of] pi-
                                                                                                    
by Muslims have been blocked. According to informants, police had told peo-
ple in Phase 12 that they must leave or else they would turn Phase 12 into a 
cemetery – that is, they would go around killing Muslims.  




yansa differs. It is higher for Muslims, maybe 50,000 pisos. For 
Christians it is lower.  
Piyansa is, of course, a formal practice within the justice system. However, 
it is not uncommon for its formality to be circumvented by corrupt prac-
tices at the precinct level. We tried to assess whether the arrests were 
part of the formal system. Bondo and the others present laughed,  
No, there are no judges there. The people stay in jail for three 
weeks, and if they can pay, they pay the police officers there. No-
body knows about it. After three weeks they have to go to the real 
prison [the official criminal justice system]. 
Going to jail and being booked in the formal system is no laughing mat-
ter, as one might never get out – both because of the threats of the war 
on drugs and because the criminal justice system is absolutely overbur-
dened and, for all intents and purposes, has collapsed (Hapal and Jensen 
2017).  
In Bondo’s narrative, there are several issues at stake that are im-
portant to our understanding of how the war on drugs is capitalised 
upon. First, the war on drugs not only impacts the relationship between 
the police and people in poor neighbourhoods, but potentially trans-
forms other social relations as well. Bondo got really lucky and the life of 
his family may have transformed for good. He had something to ex-
change – his ability to stay put – which he translated into livelihood. 
Bondo is far from the only lucky one. At the onset of the drug war, Jay, a 
tricycle driver from Bagong Silang, had seen better days. He had been 
the personal bodyguard of a barangay chairman, who was later killed. He 
had also been a security guard at a local hospital, a job he lost in 2012, 
and a member of the Special Community Action Network (SCAN), the 
private security organisation of the Iglesia ni Christo (Church of Christ, 
INC).14 The four-year lull ended with the initiation of the war on drugs. 
                                                 
14  The INC has rightly been called a state within the state. It has its own schools 
and housing areas, and the church is known to command millions of votes to 
the effect that it often determines elections. Hence, endorsement can mean the 
difference between being elected and not being elected. Furthermore, as Jay in-
dicates, the church also has its own security organisation, SCAN. SCAN has a 
reputation of violence beyond its mandate of maintaining order around INC 
functions. Allegedly, SCAN is often called in to intervene, violently, in INC 
members’ conflicts with neighbours. It is also rumoured to be composed of 
hired guns and goons of those willing to pay. According to several informants 
in Bagong Silang, SCAN was also rumoured to be involved in vigilante killings 
as part of the war on drugs. As such, the very name struck fear into people’s 
hearts to an extent where all conversations about the practices of SCAN were 
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Through connections he had with local political networks, Jay was nom-
inated as a local tanod and then became part of what is called the Com-
munity Investigative Services (CIS). The CIS was established as a nation-
al programme of surveillance in relation to the war on drugs, under the 
command of a retired army general.  
Jay showed us with pride his badge and his ID with a photo of him-
self and the general. In Jay’s account, this was all very secret, a system 
outside the other surveillance system organised around the barangay, 
purok leaders, and tanods (guards). He was also to be remunerated rela-
tively handsomely for his efforts. Asked why he joined, he said, “For the 
connections, of course!” He further explained, “It’s a good connection 
to have.” Jay’s case illustrates that resources cannot be reduced to a ques-
tion of money only. Like Bondo’s case, social relations – both vertical 
and hierarchical – are absolutely central to survival and to improving 
one’s life. The war on drugs has radically reconfigured the possibilities of 
connectivity. While much focus has been on the negative relations to the 
state and the toll on human life, it is necessary to recognise that people 
like Bondo and Jay have benefitted quite literally from the war.  
Furthermore, Jay talked at length about more direct benefits, saying 
that members of the CIS were paid money for all good information 
about drug addicts and pushers. All over Bagong Silang, stories of pay-
ments to the police and the CIS for killings abounded. Amounts as high 
(or as low, depending on one’s point of view) as PHP 10,000 were fre-
quently cited – Jay said those in the CIS were promised PHP 7,000 – and 
fed into popular narratives explaining the motives behind police killings. 
In “Murder as Enterprise,” Sheila Coronel explores these rumours and 
finds them credible. Needless to say, if true this would provide a very 
strong motive for engaging in the killings and, just as important, it would 
provide residents in Bagong Silang with an explanatory model for under-
standing the killings – although not one that is likely to improve the 
relationship between themselves and the police. In this way, Phase 12 
and the other cases presented here illustrate that the war on drugs is not 
only about killing but also about getting paid! While the case of Phase 12 
suggests a certain spatial ordering, both Bondo’s and Jay’s cases suggest 
that monetary exchange constitutes social relations that people manage 
or move into – or out of.  
                                                                                                    
carried out in hushed tones. In this way, SCAN and the INC took centre stage 
in some rather uncompromising narratives and conspiracy theories.  




Revisiting Reconfigured Relationships and  
Violence in the War on Drugs 
It is clear from the analysis above that money can be made from the war 
on drugs in direct ways as well as in terms of reconfigured relationships. 
In this final section, we will explore in more detailed ways the quality and 
significance of these reconfigured relationships. As the story of the pi-
yansa suggests, we can identify something akin to a parallel system mir-
roring the formal criminal justice system where one gets out on bail. If 
we think along this heuristic idea of a parallel system, we might say that 
the emptying of houses represents civil forfeiture. As we show above in 
this article and elsewhere (Hapal and Jensen 2017), in the parallel system 
one can also pay fees for licences or fines for smaller transgressions, or 
to have the police discipline one’s children or, indeed, carry out a murder. 
Except for the latter, these practices are couched in an ambivalent lan-
guage of assistance (tulong) and violence. Money, violence, and exchange 
are central to this system. Police practices constantly oscillate between 
those of the avenging angels of Duterte’s war on drugs and those of the 
crocodile with whom one can negotiate.  
How do we think more theoretically about this? As mentioned ear-
lier, the war on drugs lends itself to analyses of a state of exception and 
the production of bare life. However, such analyses fail to account for all 
the negotiations and exchange relations that go on. Hence, we find it 
useful to think through our material in more economic, relational terms. 
Here, Janet Roitman (2004) might offer some insights. She suggests that 
we must understand the relationships that are produced by state regula-
tion – of, in our case, criminal justice, prisons, anti-corruption, and the 
war on drugs – rather than state regulation as such. This might seem like 
a small detail. However, it moves our focus away from the policies – 
whether informal or formal – to focusing on what happens when they 
hit the ground and become part of residents’ and police’s attempts to 
survive or thrive based on relationships. It is these relationships that are 
central to how people engage with the system. If that is the case, it is 
important to understand what relationships are produced by, say, prison 
conditions – for instance, the need to get out of or, more importantly, 
stay out of prison. These relationships and the negotiations they lead to 
were incredibly complex even before the war. However, as captured in 
the notion of “ok lang,” there was a certain predictability to them – not 
always leading to good results but at least with a promise of resolution. 
The war on drugs has, we argue, radically reconfigured the parameters of 
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these relationships and how residents may negotiate them through mon-
ey, relationships, and diskarte. 
The first element in these reconfigured relationships is that the price 
of survival seems to have gone up significantly. If we compare the 
amounts that we registered before the beginning of the war on drugs, 
they are significantly lower than the amounts we and others (Coronel 
2017; Lamchek 2017) have collected since the onset of the war. This 
information is, of course, very difficult to establish with any certainty, 
not least because narratives, rumours, and forms of gossip per definition 
are unreliable sources. With this caveat in mind, the data from Bagong 
Silang and Phase 12 indicate that those related to the drug economy have 
had to pay substantial amounts of money to avoid violence being perpe-
trated against them. It is also clear that many people decided to run ra-
ther than pay the price of survival. This was especially true for Muslim 
residents in Phase 12, suggesting that the war on drugs is not only about 
drugs but also part of larger political struggles.15 It suggests that while 
money is important, we cannot reduce the war on drugs and policing 
practices to money alone. Rather, the relationships and exchange rela-
tions are animated by political categories as well.  
While we cannot be sure whether Muslims fled because it was cer-
tain they would either be killed or have to pay exorbitant amounts to 
avoid violence or death, it is fair to assume that this was a question they 
asked themselves, if we compare the Philippines with other contexts of 
violence where wars on crime and drugs have been fought. Studies in 
South Africa and Bolivia16 suggest that the unpredictability of violence is 
in fact constitutive for social relations. The studies illustrate how vio-
lence is particularly problematic when people are not certain from where 
and by whose hand it will come. Exploring the civil wars in Northern 
Ireland and Guinea Bissau, Henrik Vigh (2009) usefully suggests that 
during conflict the social terrain is fundamentally shifting, unstable, and 
illegible. Hence, people invest great efforts in rendering violence predict-
                                                 
15  The fieldwork took place during the siege of the city of Marawi, stronghold of 
the Maute brothers, who had affiliated themselves to the so-called Islamic State 
(see <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/899789/afp-44-combatants-killed-in-mara 
wi-clashes>). This produced yet more hostile narratives about Muslims 
amongst most of our informants in Bagong Silang. 
16  Elsewhere, we have explored how the war on drugs and gangs in Cape Town 
produced constant attempts to “read” the social terrain (Jensen 1999). Helene 
Risør (2010), working in Bolivia, shows how people are constantly looking for 
clues to be able to protect themselves from criminal activity. White cars on the 
road or stones in particular patterns might be indications of criminal intent that 
people try to assess to stay safe. 




able and knowable. While some human rights organisations exert much 
effort to pin all deaths on the police via a chain of command (e.g. Hu-
man Rights Watch 2017), realities are often much more complicated. In 
one case, where seven were killed in a shoot-out, we recorded three dif-
ferent potential perpetrators – the police, competing Muslim drug deal-
ers, and the Iglesia ni Cristo acting as a vigilante group. With each of 
these perpetrators or violent social networks, to paraphrase Arias (2006), 
different chains of events emerge and with them different dangers. 
Hence, as the event had not been stabilised, violence remained unpre-
dictable (Jensen 1999). The lack of certainty and the plurality of perpetra-
tors remain some of the important sources of the unstable terrain. This 
is compounded by the presence of competing police units and the con-
stant shuffling of police officers.  
Duterte has made it policy to shift around police officers to root 
out corruption. Hence, most police officers in Bagong Silang have been 
shifted to and from other places. In the time between the onset of the 
war in June 2016 and May 2017, four different station commanders had 
been assigned to Bagong Silang. Mindanao seems to play a particular role 
in this. We mentioned above how corrupt police officers are sent to 
Mindanao for “re-education” and punishment. Obviously and logically, 
there is a reverse movement from Mindanao to Bagong Silang. This has 
two possible implications for the war on drugs – one in terms of policing 
strategy and one in relation to relationships between police and residents. 
According to a barangay employee and long-term friend of one of 
the authors, the station commander made a speech at the SOBA (State 
of the Barangay Address) in April 2017 where he complained about the 
lack of collaboration from the barangay. According to the informant, he 
said, “If you do not want to collaborate with me, I am more than willing 
to bring the hell from Mindanao to Bagong Silang.” This opens up the 
possibility of counter-insurgency tactics being employed by the police 
rather than the usual local policing strategies. While this uncertainty is 
palpable, perhaps what matters for our present analysis is that residents 
will be hard-pressed to know what kind of policing will prevail in their 
next encounter with the police. Will the police be the avenging angels 
saving the nation or will they be approachable crocodiles? 
The sheer number of replacements and the circulation of officers 
compound this question. Dealing with the police in the past in a manner 
that was “ok lang” has been premised on money, connections, and 
diskarte. This also entails knowing someone on the police force who 
might know the police officers in question. However, the circulation of 
officers renders these relations potentially more difficult and less simple 
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to access. In this way, unpredictability increases because relations are 
more tenuous and need to be stabilised repeatedly. This does not mean 
that establishing relations cannot happen. When asked about this, one 
key interlocutor suggested, “But you know, they maybe be strangers one 
day, but it will not take them long to establish contacts again – maybe 
only two days [laughing]!” The humour aside, our friend’s comment 
indicates that while the circulation does create the intended alienation of 
police officers from their communities (producing de facto barrack-style 
policing), there is a willingness on the part of both police officers and 
residents to establish these contacts. They are imperative for the survival 
of residents as well as the thriving of officers.  
While this willingness to (re)create relations arguably exists on both 
sides, the sheer number of circulated officers, the different potential 
perpetrators, and the different strategies and objectives of police officers 
all contribute to heightening the unpredictability and illegibility of the 
encounters. Together with the increasing amounts of money necessary 
for survival, residents are right to ask with trepidation, “Who and what 
will I meet next time? What will it cost, and will I even be allowed to 
pay?!” In this way, the point is not that the war on drugs has introduced 
new tactics necessary for surviving a violent and corrupt turn in policing. 
The point is that strategies employed by residents of Bagong Silang to 
cope with violent and corrupt policing – money, relations, and diskarte – 
have been undermined to the extent that people are right to doubt their 
effectiveness.  
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